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JVRXSPTCTIQN 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
pursuant to Sections 78-2a-3(2)(b)(i), Utah Code Ann. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Is Summary Judgment the proper procedural vehicle 
for a District Court to dispose of a petition for review of 
a Board of Adjustment's decision, where there exist no 
genuine issues of material fact, and the only matters to be 
determined by the District Court are matters of law? 
2. Should Summary Judgment be upheld against 
Plaintiffs/Petitioners who sued the wrong party? 
3. Should Summary Judgment be upheld against parties 
who violated the statutory mandates regarding the scope of 
the District Court's review of a Board of Adjustment's 
record by introducing matters outside the record for the 
District Court's consideration? 
4. Should Summary Judgment be upheld against parties 
who failed to comply with their duty to marshall all 
evidence in favor of the Board of Adjustment's decision 
before challenging that decision? 
5. Should Summary Judgment be upheld against parties 
who failed to carry their burden to demonstrate that the 
Board of Adjustment's decision was so unreasonable as to be 
arbitrary and capricious? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
1. Section 10-9-707, Utah Code Ann, a copy of which 
is attached as Exhibit A hereto. 
2. Section 10-9-708, Utah Code Ann,, a copy of which 
is attached as Exhibit B hereto. 
3. Utah Rules pf Civil Procedure No. 56, a copy of 
which is attached as Exhibit C hereto. 
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STANDARD FQR REVIEW 
Upon review of a grant of a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, this Court gives no deference to the determination 
of the District Court and reviews the Court's legal 
conclusions for correctness. State Landscaping and Snow 
Removal v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph, 844 P.2d 
322 (Utah 1992) . 
A grant of Summary Judgment should be affirmed on 
appeal on any ground available to the District Court, even 
if not relied on by the lower court. Higgins v. Salt Lake 
County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993); Hill v. Seattle First 
National Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1992). 
In determining whether a District Court's review of the 
findings of a Board of Adjustment should be affirmed, this 
Court is subject to an "arbitrary and capricious standard," 
i.e., unless no reasonable person could have come to the 
conclusion that the Board did, the Board's decision must be 
upheld. Patterson v. Utah County Board of Adjustment, 893 
P.2d 602 (1995); National Bank of Boston v. County Board of 
Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioners filed a "Petition for Review of 
Administrative Decision" on February 28, 1995 in the Third 
Judicial District Court. [Record on Appeal (R.), 1]. In 
that Petition, Petitioners claimed to be harmed by a 
decision of the Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City 
Corporation rendered February 21, 1995. Petitioners 
requested that the Board of Adjustment's decision granting a 
variance to Gastronomy, Inc., dba Market Street Broiler & 
Fish Market and TTJ Partnership, relative to the placement 
of a garbage dumpster, be vacated. 
On March 22, 1995, Respondents filed an "Answer to 
Petition for Review of Administrative Decision." (R. 12). 
Among the defenses asserted in that Answer were the 
contentions that the Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City 
Corporation is not a proper Respondent. The Answer also 
asserted that the Board of Adjustment's decision was not 
arbitrary, capricious or illegal. 
On March 31, 1995, Petitioners filed a "Statement 
Opting Out of ADR Program." (R. 18). 
On April 11, 1995, Respondent Board of Adjustment of 
Salt Lake City Corporation filed a Motion for Summary 
4 
Judgment, with accompanying Points and Authorities attached 
thereto. (R. 28). Attached as Exhibit A to the Points and 
Authorities was a copy of the Board of Adjustment's 
"Findings and Order." (R. 37). On April 9, 1995, 
Respondents supplemented the Memorandum in Support of the 
Motion for Summary Judgment by the attachment of a copy of a 
verbatim transcript of the Board of Adjustment's proceedings 
upon which the "Findings and Order" were based. (R. 44). 
On August 28, 1995, Petitioners filed a "Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment," which they also 
denominated as a "Brief on Appeal." (R. 81). Attached to 
that Memorandum were eight exhibits, of which five exhibits 
had never been presented to the Board of Adjustment nor 
referenced in its Findings and Order or any other part of 
the record for the case upon which Petitioners' Petition was 
based. (Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6). 
On October 9, 1995, Respondents filed a "Reply in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment," (R. 113), in which 
Petitioners objected to Respondents' improper attempt to 
supplement the record beyond the minutes, findings and 
orders of the Board which constitute the only records 
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sanctioned under statute. See Section 10-9-708(4), Utah 
Code Ann. 
On November 1, 1995, Petitioners filed a "Reply Brief," 
as well as a "Notice to Submit for Decision." (R. 143). 
Respondents objected to the filing of Petitioners' 
"Reply Brief," on November 3, 1995, on the basis that under 
Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration, no "Reply 
Brief" was allowed. (R. 13 9). 
On November 16, 1995, Petitioners filed a "Response to 
Objection to Petitioners' Reply Brief." (R. 145). 
On January 29, 1996, the District Court held the first 
of two hearings on this matter. During the course of that 
hearing, the Court directed counsel for Respondents to 
supplement the record with a copy of the Board of 
Adjustment's entire file on Case No. 2150-B, the underlying 
case upon which the action was predicated, as well as an 
affidavit from a representative of the Board of Adjustment 
that such constituted the Board's entire file. The Court 
did so in order to determine whether the five exhibits 
attached to Petitioners' "Memorandum in Opposition to Motion 
for Summary Judgment" to which Respondents had objected were 
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either presented to or considered by the Board of Adjustment 
in connection with Case No. 2150-B. 
On February 7, 1996, Respondents complied with the 
District Court's direction, filing a "Second Supplement to 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment." (R. 
167). Accompanying that "Second Supplement" was an 
Affidavit from Merrill L. Nelson, the Salt Lake City Board 
of Adjustment Administrator, as well as a copy of the Board 
of Adjustment's entire file on Case No. 2150-B. (R. 171). 
Mr. Nelson's Affidavit confirmed that the five objected-to 
exhibits presented by Petitioners to the Court were neither 
filed with nor considered by the Board of Adjustment in 
making its decision on Case No. 2150-B. 
On February 27, 1996, Petitioners filed an "Objection 
to Portions of the Affidavit of Merrill L. Nelson," 
objecting specifically to his use of the word "consider" in 
connection with the Board's deliberations on Case No. 2150-
B. (R. 243). 
On March 7, 1996, Respondents replied to Petitioners' 
"Objection." (R. 240). 
A second hearing on this matter was held on March 11, 
1996. At the conclusion of oral arguments, the Court ruled 
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from the bench, granting Respondents1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
An Order Granting Summary Judgment was entered April 5, 
1996. (R. 257). 
Petitioners appealed to this Court on May 6, 1996. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Market Street Broiler, a restaurant located at 258 
South 13 00 East, applied to the Salt Lake City Board of 
Adjustment for a variance allowing a double garbage dumpster 
enclosure, without providing the required rear yard 
landscaped buffer in a B-3/CN Historic Zone abutting an R3-
A/RMF-30 zone. [Findings and Order (F. & 0), p.l] (R. 37). 
A hearing on the application, denominated Case No. 
2150-B, was heard before the Board of Adjustment on January 
30, 1995. Present for Market Street Broiler were John 
Williams, co-owner of the restaurant, Judy Reese and Lonnie 
Foster. Opposing the restaurant's application were Pamela 
Wells and Rosemary Emery, two of the Petitioners/Appellants 
herein, as well as Linda LePreau, Petitioners/Appellants1 
attorney. These persons opposing the application were 
residents whose homes were near the restaurant (F. & 0. pp. 
1 - 2, 4)(R. 37 - 38, 40). The hearing was recorded, from 
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which a verbatim transcript was prepared. [Transcript (T.), 
pp. 1 - 37] (R. 44). 
At the hearing, the Board took evidence that the area 
proposed by Market Street Broiler for enclosure was already 
being used for outside dumpsters, and had been for at least 
10 years. (F. & 0 . , p.l [R. 37]; T., p.3 [R. 46]). The 
Board further heard evidence that large dumpsters to be 
placed in the enclosure were necessary to handle the amount 
of trash produced by Market Street Broiler, and that 
sufficient space to contain the dumpsters did not exist 
inside the building. (F.& 0., p.l [R. 37]; T., pp.3-5 [R. 
46 - 48]). The Board heard evidence that Market Street 
Broiler was unable to provide a buffer in the parking lot 
because Market Street Broiler did not own the land upon 
which the parking lot was located. (F.& 0., pp. 1 - 2 [R. 
37 - 38]; T., p. 7 [R. 50]). Furthermore, the Board was 
presented with evidence that a "buffer" of sorts existed 
between the Market Street Broiler and the residential 
properties by means of an alleyway that is kept clear for 
vehicular traffic. (F.& 0., pp. 1 - 2 [R. 37 - 38]; T., pp. 
27 - 28 [R. 70 - 71]). The Board also heard evidence that 
the use of the dumpsters in their present location preceded 
9 
the adoption of the master plan defining the rear yard 
landscape buffer in a B3(CN) historic zone abutting an R3-
A(RMF-30) zone. (F. & 0., p. 1 [R. 37]; T. , pp. 3 - 5 [R. 
46 - 48] ) . 
After a full hearing, the Board granted the 
application, with the proviso that Market Street Broiler 
should work with staff members of Salt Lake City Corporation 
"to locate the enclosure as close as possible to the rear of 
the building in order that the available land between the 
enclosure and the rear property line may be landscaped in a 
manner that will provide an adequate buffer." (F. & 0., p. 
4 [R. 40] ) . 
Petitioners filed a "Petition for Review of 
Administrative Decision" with the District Court shortly 
thereafter. (See "Statement of The Case," supra). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Summary Judgment is the proper procedural vehicle 
for a District Court to dispose of a petition for review of 
a Board of Adjustment's decision. Where the District Court 
is statutorily restricted in its review to the Board of 
Adjustment's record, there can exist no genuine issues of 
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material fact, and thus the only matters to be determined by 
the District Court are matters of law. 
2. Summary Judgment should be upheld when several 
grounds existed upon which the lower court was justified in 
granting it. In the instant case, at least four independent 
bases for the District Court's disposition of this case by 
means of Summary Judgment exist: 
A. Summary Judgment should be upheld because 
Petitioners sued the wrong party. 
B. Summary Judgment should be upheld because 
Petitioners violated the statutory mandates regarding the 
scope of the District Court's review of a Board of 
Adjustment's record. Here, Petitioners introduced documents 
outside the Board of Adjustment's record and then relied on 
those documents in arguing that the Board's decision should 
have been overturned. 
C. Summary Judgment be upheld because Petitioners 
failed to comply with their duty to marshall all evidence in 
favor of the Board of Adjustment's decision before 
challenging that decision. 
D. Summary Judgment should be upheld because 
Petitioners failed to carry their burden to demonstrate that 
11 
the Board of Adjustment's decision was so unreasonable as to 
be arbitrary and capricious. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DISMISSAL OF THE CASE BY 
MEANS OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER. 
Petitioners acknowledge that "District Courts typically 
dispose of appeals from decisions of administrative agencies 
on defendants' motions to affirm or motions for summary 
judgment." (Petitioners' Opening Brief, p. 17). 
Nonetheless, Petitioners argue, Summary Judgment is not the 
proper means for dismissal of this case, because the Summary 
Judgment procedure fails to allow the Petitioners to get in 
the "last word" by way of a Reply Brief. 
Petitioners never objected to the procedure of 
resolving this case by means of Summary Judgment before the 
District Court. They did argue that the Court should 
consider a "Reply Brief" they filed as part of their 
"appeal" of the Board of Adjustment's actions, however. 
(Petitioners' "Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment" was also denominated a "Brief On Appeal" 
as well). 
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In any case, Petitioners now assert that Summary Judgment 
is not a proper method for disposing of the case, 
notwithstanding that they agree that there exist no genuine 
issues of material fact, and that the only issues to be 
determined by the court are issues of law. 
Petitioners cite no case law or statutes from Utah in 
support of their proposition, preferring instead to refer the 
Court to cases from other jurisdictions in which the Utah 
legislative scheme in dealing with land use matters does not 
apply. 
Neither the Utah statutory scheme, Utah case law nor plain 
logic stand for the proposition that Summary Judgment is an 
inappropriate method for handling appeals from Board of 
Adjustment decisions, however. Quite the opposite is true.1 
"'"Utah case law affirms the principle that Summary Judgment is the appropriate 
mechanism for determining an appeal from a Board of Adjustment decision. In Sandy City 
v. Salt Lake County. 794 P.2d 482 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), this Court upheld a District 
Court's grant of Summary Judgment in a case involving an appeal from an administrative 
land use decision of the Salt Lake County Commission. In so doing, this Court applied 
the principle that on appeal from a city's Board of Adjustment's decision, the Board's 
determination was due substantial deference under the mandates of the statutes and case 
law relative to such boards. Thus, Summary Judgment was appropriate. 
That decision was reviewed and reversed in part by the Utah Supreme Court on a writ 
of certiorari in Sandy City v. Salt Lake County. 827 P.2d 212 (Utah 1992). The technical 
grounds for the Supreme Court's partial reversal of the Utah Court of Appeals' decision 
are only peripherally pertinent to this case. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court 
of Appeals' reading of the statutes relevant to city Boards of Adjustment. That Court 
held that those statutes were not relevant to the case, however, because they do not apply 
to counties. Id. at 219. Thus, according to the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals had 
applied a correct, but inapplicable, standard. 
What is relevant to this case is that both Courts agreed that Summary Judgment is a 
proper mechanism for disposing of appeals from land-use decisions from a city Board of 
Adjustment under proper circumstances. Those circumstances exist in this case. 
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It should be obvious that Summary Judgment is a proper, 
if not even preferred, mechanism for a District Court to 
dispose of the issues placed before it in an administrative 
zoning appeal matter. Where a District Court is restricted 
to a review of the administrative record, it can hardly be 
argued that genuine issues of material fact will exist with 
regard to that record. The record will speak for itself, 
and the only question with regard thereto is whether no 
reasonable person could have decided as the Board of 
Adjustment did. (See discussion in Point 11(D), infra). 
This issue, of course, is by definition a matter of law. 
(This point was apparently conceded at the outset of this 
case by Petitioners when they filed a Statement opting out 
of the ADR program. It makes little sense to opt for 
alternative dispute resolution when the only dispute is a 
matter of law which should be determined by the appropriate 
Court). 
Thus, the important issue is not which party has a 
chance at putting in the last word, but rather which party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Summary 
Judgment is the perfect vehicle for making that 
determination. (Of course, had Petitioners been interested 
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in getting "last word" before the District Court in a proper 
procedural context, they could have filed a Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment after the filing of Respondents' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and thus filed the final Reply in support 
of the Cross-Motion). 
In the instant case, the District Court's use of 
Summary Judgment as the procedural mechanism by which to 
dismiss the case was proper and appropriate. It should be 
upheld by this Court. 
II. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE UPHELD ON ANY 
OF THE SEVERAL GROUNDS DEMONSTRATED IN 
THE LOWER COURT. 
Where there exists any reasonable basis upon which a 
District Court's judgment may be upheld on appeal, the 
judgment should be upheld. See Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 
855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993), citing Hill vs. Seattle First 
National Bank. 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1992) (a grant of 
Summary Judgment may be affirmed on appeal on any ground 
available to the lower court, even if not relied on in the 
lower court). 
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In the instant case, the District Court did not set 
forth the specific grounds upon which Summary Judgment was 
granted. As pointed out below, several grounds exist upon 
which the lower court may have granted Summary Judgment, any 
one of which constitutes an adequate basis for this Court to 
uphold that judgment. Thus, this Court may, and should, 
uphold the grant of Summary Judgment on any or all of the 
grounds upon which the lower court's decision may have been 
based. 
A. 
THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE UPHELD BECAUSE 
PETITIONERS SUED THE WRONG PARTY. 
The named Respondent, Salt Lake City Board of 
Adjustment, is not an entity that has the capacity to sue or 
be sued. In fact, it has no independent existence outside 
Salt Lake City Corporation, of which it is a division. Salt 
Lake City Corporation, the proper party defendant, has never 
been named as a party. 
Petitioners have never disputed this fact. Instead, 
Petitioners simply ignored the fact that they have sued the 
wrong party. They did not seek to either amend their 
Complaint or to dismiss the Complaint and refile against the 
proper Respondent. 
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Because Petitioners sued the wrong entity, their case 
was properly dismissed. 
B. 
THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE UPHELD 
BECAUSE PETITIONERS INAPPROPRIATELY 
INTRODUCED MATTERS OUTSIDE THE RECORD 
FOR THE COURT'S CONSIDERATION. 
The minutes, findings and orders of a board of 
adjustment constitute the entire record upon which a 
District Court may determine whether a petition for relief 
from the board1s decision may be granted. Section 10-9-
708(4), Utah Code Annptatefl. See also Xanthos v. Board of 
Adjustment. 685 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984). 
In the instant case, Petitioners impermissibly 
supplemented the record with five "exhibits" that were not 
part of the record. Petitioners1 recitation of "facts" to 
the District Court, as well as their arguments based on 
those facts, were based in large part on the "evidence" 
found in these "exhibits." As it turns out, the five 
"exhibits" were never presented to nor considered by the 
Board of Adjustment with regard to Case No. 2150-B, the case 
upon which Petitioners1 Petition was based. 
Petitioners blatantly and deliberately infected the 
proceedings with matters outside the scope of the District 
17 
Court's proper purview in clear violation of statute. After 
Respondents objected to Petitioners1 improper actions, 
additional briefing and an additional court hearing 
confirmed that Petitioners had indeed acted inappropriately 
by attempting to "salt" the record with "exhibits" that 
should never have made their way into court. 
Petitioners' arguments to the District Court as to the 
merits of their case were fundamentally based on "evidence" 
contained in the impermissible "exhibits." As presented to 
the District Court, Petitioners' case could not be logically 
analyzed without reference to the "evidence" which did not 
form part of the record to which the District Court (and 
this Court) must limit its review. Petitioners' argument 
and the supplemental "exhibits" were inextricably linked. 
See Petitioners' "Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment." (R. 81). 
Without these impermissible "exhibits," Petitioners had 
no legal or logical leg to stand on. (In fact, even with 
the exhibits, Petitioners' case was meritless). The Court's 
grant of the motion for Summary Judgment was thus proper 
under these circumstances. 
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c. 
THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE UPHELD 
BECAUSE THE PETITIONERS FAILED TO MEET THEIR 
BURDEN OF MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE. 
The "marshaLling" requirements for a petitioner in the 
context of challenging a determination of the Board of 
Adjustment is set forth in Heinecke v. Department of 
Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 464 (Utah App. 1991): 
Heinecke argues adamantly, and at 
great length, that the division's 
findings generally are not supported by 
substantial evidence. He fails, 
however, to point out exactly which 
findings are unsupported by substantial 
evidence, and how the evidence is 
insufficient. To successfully challenge 
such findings on judicial review of 
administrative action, a party must 
demonstrate that the findings are "not 
supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court.'1 Utah Code Annotated 
§63-46B-16(4) (g) (1989) ; Grace Drilling 
v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67-68 
(Utah App. 1989). In order to do this, 
a party must marshall the evidence, 
Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68, i.e., it 
"must marshall the evidence in support 
of the findings and then demonstrate 
that despite this evidence, the . . . 
findings are so lacking in support11 as 
to be inadequate under the applicable 
standard of review. 
Mountain States Broadcasting Company v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 
553 (Utah App. 1989). (Emphasis added). 
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Petitioners failed completely to marshall the evidence 
in support of the board's findings before the District 
Court, a necessary requisite to prosecuting their case. 
They have also failed to marshall this evidence before this 
Court. At no point have Petitioners pointed to any evidence 
that would support the Board's findings. 
Petitioners' failure to marshall the evidence in 
support of the Board's decision was, in and of itself, 
enough of a basis for the District Court to deny 
Petitioners' petition and to grant Summary Judgment in 
City's favor. It stands as an adequate basis for this Court 
to uphold that judgment. 
D. 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S JUDGMENT SHOULD 
BE UPHELD BECAUSE PETITIONERS FAILED 
TO CARRY THEIR BURDEN TO DEMONSTRATE 
THAT THE BOARD"S DECISION WAS SO 
UNREASONABLE AS TO BE ARBITRARY 
AND CAPRICIOUS. 
In challenging the Board of Adjustment's decision, a 
petitioner "may only allege that the Board of Adjustment's 
decision was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." Section 
17-27-708(2), Utah Code Annotated. In order to show that a 
Board of Adjustment has acted arbitrarily or capriciously, a 
petitioner must demonstrate that no reasonable person could 
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have concluded as this board did. "[W]e must simply 
determine, in light of the evidence before the board, 
whether a reasonable mind could reach the same conclusion as 
the board. It is not our prerogative to weigh the evidence 
anew." Patterson v. Utah County Board of Adjustment. 893 
P.2d 602, 604 (1995) . This difficult requirement presents a 
heavy burden on a petitioner. Thus, as summarized by this 
Court in the Patterson case, "the Boardfs actions are 
accorded substantial deference and will be rejected on 
appeal only if they are so unreasonable as to be arbitrary 
and capricious or if they violate the law. The reason for 
this lies in the substantial discretion granted boards of 
adjustment." id. at 603. 
A reviewing court is under a duty to presume that a 
Board of Adjustment has acted correctly and properly. As 
the Utah Supreme Court stated in Thurston v. Cache County. 
626 P.2d 440 (1981), "the [board] is afforded broad latitude 
of discretion, and its decisions are afforded a strong 
presumption of validity." I&. at 445 (emphasis added). 
Thus, as the Patterson court concluded: 
Accordingly, we will not substitute our 
judgment on matters of public policy 
normally left to the board's discretion; 
we will simply insure that the board 
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proceeds within the limits of fairness 
and justice and acts in good faith to 
achieve permissible ends. The board 
will be found to have exercised its 
discretion within the proper boundaries 
unless its decision is arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal. 
Patterson. 893 P.2d at 604. 
Petitioners1 broadside attack on the Board's decision 
failed to demonstrate that the Board's decision was so 
unreasonable as to be arbitrary and capricious, and that no 
reasonable person could have so decided. 
Petitioners argued to the District Court that because 
the Board did not make specific findings on each of the 
criteria set forth in Section 10-9-707(2)(a), Utah Code 
Annotated, by definition, its decision somehow could not be 
justified. In particular, Petitioners argued that because 
the Board did not use the magical terms "unreasonable 
hardship" and "special circumstances" in its findings, the 
Board's decision must not have complied with statute. They 
have reiterated those arguments before this Court. 
Petitioners were plainly wrong below and are plainly 
wrong here. There is no requirement in the statutes that a 
Board of Adjustment make specific findings relative to each 
of the statutory criteria. The statutes are equally bereft 
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of any requirement that the terms "unreasonable hardship" 
and "special circumstances" must be used. Rather, the broad 
standards enunciated by the courts require only that "the 
board proceeds within the limits of fairness and justice and 
acts in good faith to achieve permissible ends." Patterson. 
supra, at 604. 
In the instant case, had Petitioners marshalled the 
evidence in support of the Board's decision as they were 
required to do, they would have discovered that the evidence 
upon which the Board relied complies with all necessary 
statutory criteria, including "unreasonable hardship" and 
"special circumstances." 
As pointed out above, evidence presented to the Board 
demonstrated that the area proposed by Market Street Broiler 
for enclosure was already being used for outside dumpsters, 
and had been for at least 10 years. Furthermore, large 
dumpsters to be placed in the enclosure were necessary to 
handle the amount of trash produced by Market Street 
Broiler. Sufficient space to contain the dumpsters did not 
exist inside the building. The evidence showed that Market 
Street Broiler was unable to provide a buffer in the parking 
lot because Market Street Broiler did not own the land upon 
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which the parking lot was located. In addition, the evidence 
showed that a "buffer" of sorts already existed between the 
Market Street Broiler and the residential properties by means 
of an alleyway that is kept clear for vehicular traffic. The 
evidence also demonstrated that the use of the dumpsters in 
their present location had long preceded the adoption of the 
master plan defining the rear yard landscape buffer in a B3(CN) 
historic zone abutting an R3-A(RMF-30) zone. 
Given these facts, it cannot be said that no reasonable 
mind could agree with the Board that a variance was justified 
or that the Board's findings were inconsistent with statutory 
criteria. There existed substantial evidence of "unreasonable 
hardship," "special circumstances," and all other statutory 
requirements for the granting of a variance. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Summary Judgment 
issued in Respondents1 favor should be upheld, and the judgment 
affirmed on appeal. 
DATED this *i — day of October, 1996. 
XiPnMiWMMZk-^ 
Ranqall K. Edwards 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorney for Respondent Salt Lake City 
Board of Adjustment 
24 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing brief to the below listed by depositing the same 
the U.S. mail, postage prepaid thereon, this day of 
October, 1996 
Linda LePreau 
252 Douglas Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102-2611 
Martin Banks 
STOEL RIVES BOLEY JONES & GREY 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-4904 
1 
EXHIBIT A 
10-9-707. Variances. 
(1) Any person or entity desiring a waiver or modification of 
the requirements of the zoning ordinance as applied to a 
parcel of property that he owns, leases, or in which he holds 
some other beneficial interest may apply to the board of 
adjustment for a variance from the terms of the zoning 
ordinance. 
(2) (a) The board of adjustment may grant a variance only 
if: 
(i) literal enforcement of the zoning ordinance 
would cause an unreasonable hardship for the appli-
cant that is not necessary to carry out the general 
purpose of the zoning ordinance; 
(ii) there are special circumstances attached to the 
property that do not generally apply to other proper- . 
ties in the same district; < 
(iii) granting the variance is essential to the enjoy-
ment of a substantial property right possessed by H 
other property in the same district; 2 
(iv) the variance will not substantially affect the ~ 
general plan and will not be contrary to the public w 
interest; and 
(v) the spirit of the zoning ordinance is observed 
and substantial justice done. 
(b) (i) In determining whether or not enforcement of 
the zoning ordinance would cause unreasonable 
hardship under Subsection (2)(a), the board of adjust-
ment may not find an unreasonable hardship unless 
the alleged hardship: 
(A) is located on or associated with the prop-
erty for which the variance is sought; and 
(B) comes from circumstances peculiar to the 
property, not from conditions that are general to 
the neighborhood. 
(ii) In determining whether or not enforcement of 
the zoning ordinance would cause unreasonable 
hardship under Subsection (2)(a), the board of adjust-
ment may not find an unreasonable hardship if the 
hardship is self-imposed or economic. 
(c) In determining whether or not there are special 
circumstances attached to the property under Subsection 
(2)(a), the board of adjustment may find that special 
circumstances exist only if the special circumstances: 
(i) relate to the hardship complained of; and 
(ii) deprive the property of privileges granted to 
other properties in the same district. 
(3) The applicant shall bear the burden of proving that all 
of the conditions justifying a variance have been met. 
(4) Variances run with the land. 
(5) The board of adjustment and any other body may not 
grant use variances. 
(6) In granting a variance, the board of adjustment may 
impose additional requirements on the applicant that will: 
(a) mitigate any harmful affects of the variance; or 
(b) serve the purpose of the standard or requirement 
that is waived or modified. 1992 
EXHIBIT B 
CQ 
10-9-708. District court review of board of adjustment 
decision. 
(1) Any person adversely affected by any decision of a board 
of adjustment may petition the district court for a review of 
the decision. 
(2) In the petition, the plaintiff may only allege that the 
board of adjustment's decision was arbitrary, capricious, or 
illegal. 
(3) The petition is barred unless it is filed within 30 days ^ 
after the board of adjustment's decision is final. £j 
(4) (a) The board of adjustment shall transmit to the re- g 
viewing court the record of its proceedings including its >< 
minutes, findings, orders and, if available, a true and 
correct transcript of its proceedings. 
(b) If the proceeding was tape recorded, a transcript of 
that tape recording is a true and correct transcript for 
purposes of this subsection. 
(5) (a) (i) If there is a record, the district court's review is 
limited to the record provided by the board of actfust-
ment. 
(ii) The court may not accept or consider any 
evidence outside the board of adjustment's record 
unless that evidence was offered to the board of 
adjustment and the court determines that it was 
improperly excluded by the board of adjustment, 
(b) If there is no record, the court may call witnesses 
and take evidence. 
(6) The court shall affirm the decision of the board of 
adjustment if the decision is supported by substantial evi-
dence in the record. 
(7) (a) The filing of a petition does not stay the decision of 
the board of adjustment. 
(b) (i) Before filing the petition, the aggrieved party 
may petition the board of adjustment to stay its 
decision. 
(ii) Upon receipt of a petition to stay, the board of 
adjustment may order its decision stayed pending 
district court review if the board of adjustment finds 
it to be in the best interest of the municipality. 
(iii) After the petition is filed the petitioner may 
seek an injunction staying the board of adjustment's 
decision. 1991 
EXHIBIT C 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, 
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judg-
ment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for 
summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or with-
out supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor 
upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judg-
ment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as 
to all or any part thereof 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall 
be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. 
The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve 
opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered . 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interroga- CJ 
tories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if = 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact ^ 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a H 
matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in charac- H 
ter, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although ffi 
there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. ^ 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion 
under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case 
or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at 
the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the 
evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if prac-
ticable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually and in good 
faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specify-
ing the facts that appear without substantial controversy, 
including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceed-
ings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the 
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial 
shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense re-
quired. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred 
to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. 
The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or op-
posed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not 
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but 
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear 
from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he 
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to 
justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for 
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or 
may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the 
satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits 
presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or 
solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order 
the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the 
affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's 
fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged 
guilty of contempt. 
